The enthusiasm surrounding high-technology (high-tech) indus tries is in part a response to the prospect of future employment growth and to the expectation that these industries will form the basis of self-sustaining local/ regional economies. Currently, how ever, states and communities compete for high-tech employment with only a vague understanding of the forces governing the diffusion of high-tech development. All too often they use scarce public revenues to attract these industries with little assurance of long-run returns on such investment.
Most of these state and local efforts assume that high-tech indus tries are dependable job generators. They operate as if high-tech industries are highly mobile and can as easily be drawn to older central city areas as to newer Sunbelt suburban industrial parks. Often, they are premised on the belief that high-tech facilities draw other activities around them and set off sustained economic growth (Office of Technology Assessment, 1983) . In addition, high-tech operations are often assumed in economic development plans to be dominated by small businesses and thus to share the innovative characteristics and strong growth potential ascribed to small firms (Markusen, Weiss, 1984) .
To date, however, insufficient evidence has been presented on the actual performance of high-tech industries as generators of regional economic development. In this article, we examine empir ically four simple hypotheses about high-tech industry i ocational behavior: (1) high-tech manufacturing industries are uniformly sub stantial job generators; (2) high-tech employment growth occurs in both older industrial areas as well as newly developing sites; (3) high-tech industries show the same or higher rates of small busi ness incidence than do manufacturing industries as a whole; (4) high-tech plants are frequently found in tandem with plants in other high-tech sectors. Preliminary results of a year long study of high-tech industry growth and location tendencies (Glasmeier, Hall, Markusen, 1983a) cast some light on these issues.
B. Defining High Technology Industries
The definition of high-technology industry is controversial (Glasmeier, Markusen, Hall, 1983c) . In most popular literature, any industry related to electronics or information-processing is referred to as "high-tech" . When the discussion ventures beyond this popular definition , three measures typically are used to define these industries: degree of product sophistication, employment growth rates, and R&D as a percent of sales. There are serious problems with each.
The first measure , sophistication of product, relies on subjective judgement in choosing industries from the Standard Industrial Classification Manual (SIC) (Vinson, 1979) . As such, it identifies the most obvious industries such as computers fairly well, but over looks those such as biogenetics that are newly emerging, and others that are of a process-nature such as crystal-growth technology.
The second measure , employment growth, though objective, lacks precision and comparability. For example, it is unable to dis tinguish between newly emerging industries and other fast-growing consumer industries, such as household furnishings; and it over looks more mature industries such as chemicals as well as more capital-intensive industries such as petroleum refining which, on the basis of R&D expenditures and occupational structure , could be considered high-tech. It also eliminates many defense-related industries because of their sporadic growth record, such as guided missiles and space vehicles.
The third measure, R&D as a percent of sales, has similar limita tions based on the way it is calculated. Industries identified by this measure are likely to be new and in the early stages of the product life cycle. Industries with comparatively low rankings are those such as chemicals and even computers which have huge sales figures as the denominator of the measure (TMA, 1982) . At a more fu ndamental level, this measure assumes R&D activities are homogeneous across all industries. As Gold (1979) points out, R&D levels vary across industries, firms, and products, making inter-industry comparisons difficult. Some of the apparent variation is based on the orientation of the research: product differentiation versus new product development. Other factors limiting comparis ons include: the method of accounting for R&D expenditures, and differences among firm development strategies.
In our analysis we sought a criterion that would be systematic and comprehensive in defining high-tech industries. One consistent characteristic which can be applied systematically across all indus tries is the degree of technical skill employed within them. More importantly, occupational composition measures the capacity within an industry to apply scientific and engineering skills to the develop ment of products and processes.
In our research, high-tech industries were identified as those where engineers, engineering technicians, computer scientists, mathematicians and life scientists comprise a greater proportion of total employment than the average for all manufacturing. Using the 1980 Occupational Employment Statistics Survey (OES) , 29 industries were identified as high -technology. The OES provides detailed occupational profiles for all industries at a three-digit SIC 132 level. These twenty-nine industry groupings were expanded to include their 4-digit components, bringing the total number of industries analyzed to 100.
As with the three previous definitions, using three-digit occupa tional data has analytical limitations. Using the three-digit OES sur vey assumes that the four-digit counterpart product groups use comparable levels of scientific, engineering and technical personnel. A similar aggregation problem also plagues R&D expenditure statis tics comprehensively available only at a three-digit level. Despite these limitations, researchers have increasingly preferred definitions of high-tech based on occupational data (Vinson, 1979; Brookings, 1983; Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) , 1983; Business Week, 1983) .
But among occupationally-based definitions, there remains disagreements in lists of industries considered high-tech. These differences result from the percentage of scientific and technical personnel selected as a cut-off point to identify high-tech industries.
We used the national manufacturing industry average for engineering, scientific and technical personnel. We prefer the manufacturing average for two reasons. The first is that our analysis concentrates on manufacturing industries. Second, we chose the average with the intention of testing different groupings of indus tries as part of our ongoing research.
Differences among alternative lists of high-tech industries pri marily result from the inclusion of sectors other than manufactur ing and from the choice of cutoff criteria. Vinson's criteria is simi lar to ours with two exceptions: he included services and he used the durable manufacturing industry average as the cut-off point (Vinson, 1983) . On the basis of these differences his list includes 8 fewer three-digit industries than ours. Brookings used Vinson's definition but further excluded eight fo ur-digit business service industries (1983, p.25) . Their list includes eighty-eight fo ur digit industries. The strict definition proposed by the BLS includes just 6 industries; the more liberal one based on R&D statistics and occu pational profiles includes 28 three-digit industries. With the -excep tion of the highly selective BLS definition, the individual three-digit industry groupings are quite similar.
The real problem, of course, is that "high-tech" connotes different industrial features to different interested parties. We believe that an occupational definition comes closest to capturing the multiplicity of connotations important to planners. Our choice is reinforced by the fact that alternative data bases are less reliable and bear similar aggregation problems. Additional research based on sectoral and production characteristics is one possible avenue fo r overcoming some of the more troublesome definitional difficulties.
C. High Tech Locational Data
Using the 1972 and 1977 unpublished Census of Manufacturers Plant Location data, we compiled county-level four-digit industry tallies of manufacturing plants by employment size category (Giasmeier, Markusen, Hall, 1983b) . Combining this with pub lished employment data, we estimated industry employment levels. Cross-checking with published national industry employment and plant totals confirmed the stability of our results: estimates across all 100 industries showed less than one percent variation between the published and estimated employment counts; individual indus try employment estimates varied by less than 10%.
The time period analyzed is important to consider on two counts. First, the starting point, 1972, reflects the early decline of the Viet Nam War effort; therefore, defense-related manufacturing employ ment was likely to have been depressed. Second, in the intervening period the United States experienced a serious recession and was just emerging from its worst affects by 1977. Despite the limitations of the time period, it does provide an opportunity to study high-tech employment growth without the influence of high levels of defense spending. Nevertheless, pre-1972 and post-1977 data would add substantially to our analysis. Unfortunately, changes in industry classifications that occurred in 1972 limit analysis of earlier data (1963 and 196 7) ; more recent data will not be available from the Census until late 1984.
To explore the hypotheses about high-tech growth and location behavior, we used the 264 Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas, (SMSA) as defined in 1977 for the spatial unit of analysis. Distinc tions among SMSA's were made based on their central-city status. Metropolitan (metros) areas which have a major urban center, for example New York, Chicago, San Francisco, were considered big city SMSA 's. Metros that have recently achieved SMSA status or are suburbs of big-city metros, and were designated metros because of population size irrespective of economic maturity, were con sidered suburban adjacent metro areas.
D. High Technology Industry Growth
In 1977, high-technology industries represented 12% of all manufacturing business establishments, contributing 5J40,000 jobs or 26% of all manufacturing employment (Census of Manufacturers 1972 Manufacturers , 1977 . Over the five year period studied, the 100 high-tech industries grew by eight percent, while general manufacturing grew by only three percent.
This growth rate, though impressive, was not consistent across the 100 industries (Table 0 . Thirty-four out of the 100 industries studied actually lost employment and 4 failed to grow at the manufacturing average. Losses and gains varied from the dismal 65 percent decline in SIC's 3483 and 3769, the Munitions and Guided Missile Industries, to the dramatic 110 percent increase in SIC 3795, Tanks and Tank Components.
Nor was there consistent growth within three-digit industry groupings. Industry groups such as Office, Computing, and Accounting Machines, including Computers, grew only slightly faster than the high-tech average. The substantial 33.6 percent growth in computers was nearly offset by the 24 percent decline in calculating and accounting machines. This example suggests that four-digit industries within the same three-digit grouping may act as substitutes for one another. The regional implications of such divergent growth rates depend upon the extent to which production of individual products occurs in the same or different locations. On the basis of aggregate statistics, then, sub-sectors within high-tech industries over the period studied were not uniform job generators. In addition, our research suggests that there is a high degree of product substitution and a rapid rate of obsolescence inherent m high -tech industries (Giasmeier, Hall, Markusen, 1983c) . Public policy proposals aimed at picking "winning" indus- tries, or even industry groups, are therefore likely to produce uneven results.
E. Metropolitan High Tech Industry Growth
Twenty-two states have some type of development program geared to attract and maintain high-tech industries (Office of Tech nology Assessment, 1983) . States in every region see high-tech industries as a solution to their unemployment problems as well as key instruments for the repair and expansion of their economic base. To what extent does the growth of high-tech employment and plants over the period studied support this enthusiasm?
Eight-six of the 264 SMSA 's studied lost high tech employment during the mid 1970's and the regional distribution of these metro politan employment losers contains a few surprises. Twenty-six (27 percent) out of ninety-seven Southern metro areas lost employ ment� twenty-eight (37 percent) of the seventy-five Midwestern metros also lost employment. Half, or twenty-three of the forty-six Northeastern metropolitan areas were net employment losers, while only eleven (25 percent) of forty-four Western metro areas lost jobs. Thus, contrary to popular belief, the Sunbelt is not immune to high-tech job shifts.
While our analysis includes all 264 Standard Metropolitan Statisti cal Areas as defined in 1977, here we present only the results of the top ten employment and plant gainers and losers. Although this shorthand ·picture is only a partial presentation of on-going research, significantly, both high-tech employment and plant winners and losers comprise more than fo rty percent of the total high-tech industry change over the period studied.
Me tropolitan High Te chnology Employment Gains and Losses
In general,losing metro areas consisted of older big-city SMSA's. Winners, on the other hand, tended to be newer, adjacent suburban metropolitan communities (Table II) . This pattern is not unlike that of total manufacturing decentralization which has occurred over the last several decades (Walker, 197 6) .
Using a loose four region breakdown which places the Plains states in the Midwest and Texas in the South, a number of interesting findings emerge. While overall the Northeast fared better than the Midwest in terms of high-tech job loss, five of the ten largest losers were Northeastern metropolitan areas� New York state alone lost 14,000 jobs in the New York City and Syracuse metros. Even two mature Sunbelt big-city SMSA's, Miami and Los Angeles, were among the top ten losers despite substantial gains in their surrounding suburban areas.
The top ten winners closely resemble what are popularly thought of as high-tech centers. The San Jose SMSA, home of "Silicon Val ley" , and the Boston SMSA, home of "Route 128" , together accounted for 11% of the total metro high-tech gains. The top 10 job gainers were collectively responsible for 41% of high-tech employment growth. 
Me tropolitan High Te ch Plant Gains and Losses
If big-city metro areas have been overlooked by high-tech job growth, they have not lost out entirely in the growth of new plants ( Table Ill) . The 6691 new high-tech plants established in the mid 1970's were more evenly distributed across both regions and types of metropolitan communities than employment growth. -5 -5
Net changes in high-tech plant location offer an approximate measure of the location of new high-tech growth. Although there is a strong resemblance between places with significant net plant change and those with significant net employment change , there are also several anomalies. Metropolitan plant gainers, like their employment counterpart, accounted for a substantial portion of all new plants created in the mid 1970's. The top ten locations accounted for 38% of all new plants; the top twenty contributed 64%. This pattern of plant growth suggests that although 81% of the 264 metropolitan areas gained at least one plant, the majority of new plant growth was highly concentrated in a few locations.
Of the top ten plant gainers, however, only half ranked as well in employment growth (Anaheim, San Jose, Dallas, Houston, and Boston) . Los Angeles, at the other end of the extreme, was the ninth largest job loser even though it was the second largest plant gainer. This suggests that Los Angeles may still be hosting the growth of small, innovative, experimental or specialty high-tech establishments while losing out in the competition to maintain larger scale, more standardized manufacturing operations. In Chi cago, also, smaller average size plants accounted for higher plant gain than job gain.
Plant losers, with few exceptions, resemble job losers. New York state shows the biggest loss with three of the state's ten metro areas, New York, Albany-Schenectady, and Elmira, losing a total of 175 plants. Among this group the magnitude of plant loss differs dramatically: the New York city metro area lost 159 plants, almost 10 times as many as the next loser, Jersey City, with 17. In three of the four regions, the Midwest, South, and Northeast, the number of metropolitan plant losers were almost equal (1 0-12); the West, on the other hand, lost plants in only one metropolitan area.
In summary, then, this evidence suggests high-tech industries alone are not likely to bring salvation to declining central cities. In fact, the substantial concentration of both new jobs and plants sug gests that the beneficiaries of high-tech employment growth are, with a few exceptions, likely to be suburban communities primarily located in the western United States. Firm formation in high-tech sectors differs substantially from that of the general manufacturing establishment population (Brookings, 1983) . Our research indicates that high-tech industries have sub stantially larger manufacturing plants than manufacturing industries in general. In 1977, high-tech average plant employment was 114 as compared with the all manufacturing average of 54. A study by the Brookings Institution also showed that high-tech industry aver age plant size substantially exceeded the manufacturing average. Furthermore, according to this study based on Dunn and Bradstreet data, 58% of the jobs in all industries are in multi-establishment firms, whereas almost 90% of the jobs in high-tech industries are of this fo rm. A high degree of absentee-ownership coupled with plants of greater than average size suggests a somewhat different pattern of economic development than is popularly associated with innovative activities.
G. Metropolitan High Technology Industry Dominance
Given the fo rm of ownership and the average establishment size of high-technology industries, we explored the extent to which metropolitan high-tech employment was distributed among the industries studied. As part of this effort we calculated a measure of industry dominance using estimated employment and industry incidence across SMSA 's. Dominant industries are defined as those fo ur-digit sectors accounting for the largest proportion of employ ment in all high-tech industries within SMSA's.
Our results indicate that high-tech employment is concentrated in one industry in a substantial portion of the metro areas st1,1died. In 1972, one industry accounted for at least 50% of all high-tech employment in 86 (34%) SMSA's. Some 30 metropolitan areas had greater than 70% of their estimated high-tech employment concen trated in one industry . The number of SMSA's dominated by one industry declined slightly in 1977 to 75, although the number of SMSA's with greater than 70% of their employment concentrated in one industry actually increased slightly. On the basis of this indica tor it is clear that in 30% of the metro areas in both 1972 and 1977, one 4-digit industry accounted for the greatest proportion of areal high-tech employment.
With few exceptions, metro areas exhibiting highly concentrated high-tech employment were located outside both central cities and sub-state regional metropolitan centers. A large number of these metros are non-adj acent SMSA's, with an additional group lying out side but in close proximity to regional metro centers. Over 50% of these SMSA 's were located in the South, with Texas (11), Florida (8), and Virginia (5) having the highest proportion of SMSA 's dominated by large single industry establishments.
Austin (TX) and Tucson (AZ) , were two SMSA 's popularly thought of as a high-tech centers that had more than 50% of their estimated high-tech employment concentrated in one industry . In Austin, nine plants in SIC 3662, Radio, TV, Transmitting Signal Devices and Equipment accounted for 53% of estimated high-tech jobs. Tucson's dominant industry was SIC 3761 Guided Missiles; one plant accounted fo r an 74% of high-tech employment. Melbourne-Titusville (FL) , a metro area heavily dependent on high-tech industries had more than 70% of its high-tech employ ment concentrated in ten plants in one industry, SIC 3761, Guided Missiles. And finally, Seattle (W A) , well-known as the home of Boeing Aircraft Corporation, had 53% of its estimated high-tech employment concentrated in five plants in SIC 2721, Aircraft .
Conclusions
During the mid 1970's high-technology industries were not uni fo rm job generators . Nor was the growth of high-tech employment in the mid 1970's distributed evenly across metropolitan areas. Instead, high-tech employment growth was heavily concentrated in a select number of largely suburban metropolitan areas. High tech average plant size and ownership characteristics differed substan tially from manufacturing in general. In a significant percentage of the metropolitan areas studied, high-tech employment was concen trated in one or a few industries.
These findings suggest that any public policy which indiscrim inately targets high-tech industries is a questionable economic development strategy. A number of high-tech industries are also declining industries. Even if it were possible to attract a plant of a fast growing industry, there is no guarantee it would still be creat ing new jobs five years from now.
Similarly, high-tech industries in and of themselves are not likely to be the solution for older industrial metropolitan economies. As our research shows, the bulk of new high-tech job growth in the mid 1970's occurred in suburban metropolitan areas. While attempts to create high-tech research and development centers may prove successful in selected areas, investing in the technical and professional components of high-tech industries is not likely to result in the creation of a substantial number of new jobs for low skilled inner-city residents. Unless policies are aimed at employ ment opportunities which match local skills, new jobs will go to new immigrants, and the existing allocation of jobs will largely be unchanged.
High-tech employment is also concentrated in multi establishment enterprises with larger than average size plants. This suggests that high-tech employment and plants are often depen dent on outside corporate investment decisions. If the goal is to inspire the development of locally-based innovative potential, then a more appropriate target would be locally/regionally based firms.
To conclude, economic development strategies which focus on one set of industries to the exclusion of more traditional employ ment sources may ultimately be trading off one set of d ependent conditions for another. Chances are good that communities with strong economic bases will prove attractive to high-tech industries regardless of the incentives they might offer. Clearly, any policy attempting to attract high-tech will need to be carefully targeted in order to match the needs and assets of the local community.
